This paper provides a self-contained discussion about the introduction of the animal spirits hypothesis into the infinite horizon (IH) optimal growth model. Our analysis begins with a quick economic review of the Pontryagin's maximum principles. Thereafter, we develop a continuous version of the increasing-returns BenhabibFarmer (1994) model by showing the possible sub-optimality of the central planner solution and deriving the condition for indeterminacy. Moreover, we give some insights on how to model intrinsic (fundamental) and extrinsic uncertainty. Finally, analysing the (spot) equilibrium condition of the labour market, we provide a rationale for the mechanism that in this model might lead prophecies to be self-fulfilling.
Introduction
The importance of beliefs and expectations in economics -together with the possibility of an involuntary unemployment equilibrium -is probably one of the most important element of the Keynesian legacy. After the publication of the General Theory (1936), the term "animal spirits" has been widely exploited to describe situations in which self-validating expectations or beliefs are the main sources of expansions or depressions 1 .
In spite of the old and ample evidence about the influence of subjective factors on economic outcomes, early writers -including Keynes -did not develop dynamic models in which realized outcomes were related to agents' expectations 2 . Only the rational expectations (RE) revolution of the 70s provided a straightforward way to endogenize beliefs. Specifically, the macroeconomists of RE assumed that agents' expectations were "essentially the same as the predictions of the relevant economic theory". See the seminal paper by Muth (1961) . Dynamic RE models were developed by using two distinct frameworks, i.e., the overlapping generations (OLG) model and the infinite horizon (IH) model. The former assumes that there is an infinite set of agents each of whom lives for a finite number of periods (usually two or three). See, for example, Samuelson (1958) . By contrast, the latter assumes a finite number of agents (usually one) that live forever. See, for example, Koopmans (1965) . In both kinds of framework, in spite of the respective differences, it is possible to show that if the RE equilibrium path is unique, then expectations must be univocally determined by technology, preferences and endowments. Therefore, dynamic RE models with a unique equilibrium path do not allow for self-fulfilling prophecies.
At the beginning of the 80s, relaxing the hypothesis of RE equilibrium path uniqueness, both OLG and IH models have be used also to develop the idea that animal spirits might exert an independent influence on economic activity. However, given the difficulties to synchronize the OLG framework with the average period of the business cycle, HI models are now considered the favoured candidates to explain how "extrinsic uncertainty", i.e., random phenomena that do not affect fundamentals, might spark fluctuations in which prices or quantities change simply because are expected to and price signals convey no 1 Keynes (1936) did not use "animal spirits" to mean self-fulfilling beliefs; instead his view of uncertainty was closer to Frank Knight's (1921) concept of an event for which there is too little information to make a frequentist statement about probabilities.
2 Azariadis (1981) reminds the Dutch "tulip mania", the South Sea bubble in England and the collapse of the Mississippi Company as three well-documented cases of speculative price movements which historians consider unwarranted by "objective" conditions. More recently, we remind the bubble of technological equities.
structural information 3 .
This paper provides a self-contained discussion about the introduction of the animal spirits hypothesis into the IH optimal growth model. Our analysis begins with a quick economic review of the Pontryagin's maximum principles aimed at stressing the importance of the concavity of the Hamiltonian function and the role of the transversality conditions in defining the first-order conditions (FOCs) for a maximum problem in discrete and continuous time. Thereafter, we develop a version of the increasing-returns Benhabib-Farmer (1994) model -which is a prime example in the literature of HI models with self-fulfilling prophecies -by showing the problematic nature of the social planner solution and the optimality of the decentralized "symmetric" equilibrium. Moreover, after having derived the condition for indeterminacy, we give some theoretical insights on how to model intrinsic (fundamental) and extrinsic uncertainty. Finally, analysing the (spot) equilibrium condition of the labour market, we provide a rationale for the mechanism that in this model might lead prophecies to be self-validating.
The paper is arranged as follows. Section 2 derives some basic principles for the solution of maximum problems in discrete and continuous time. Section 3 develops a version of the Benhabib-Farmer (1994) model. Section 4 provides a rationale for the mechanism that allows prophecies to be self-fulfilling. Finally, section 5 concludes.
Some Basic Principles on Optimal Control Problems
In this section we provide a quick economic review of the Pontryagin's maximum principle that will be useful for the solution of Benhabib-Farmer (1994) model in continuous time 4 . Specifically, starting from the discrete case, we derive the necessary (and sometimes sufficient) conditions to solve a maximum problem defined over a finite and an infinite horizon.
Finite-Horizon
Suppose to be interested in the solution of the following discrete-time finite-horizon maximum problem:
3 Extrinsic uncertainty is sometime referred also as "sunspot activity". See, for example, Woodford (1990). 4 See Pontryagin et al. (1962) .
Interpreting ρ as a discount rate, i.e., the psychological cost of having something tomorrow instead of having it today, the problem outlined above suggests that we are interested in finding a sequence {u t , x t+1 } T t=0 that maximizes the discounted sum of different realizations of the instantaneous objective function J (·) subject to the dynamic constraints implied by (2) . Thereafter, it follows immediately that the elements of {u t , x t+1 } T t=0 have not the same degree of freedom. Specifically, while the vector u t is free, within limits, to be chosen (control variables), the evolution of x t (state variables) is conditioned by f (·).
The problem in (1) and (2) can be solved by writing a Lagrangian. Hence,
is a vector of Lagrange multipliers. Standard results on duality suggest that λ can be interpreted as a system of implicit prices that defines the values of the marginal contribution to J(·) of a variation in x. See, for example, Mas-Colell et al. (1995) . Assuming that L(·) is concave, the FOCs for a maximum take the following form:
where
is optimal sequence that solves the dynamic problem in (1) and (2). Suppose to define the following auxiliary or Hamiltonian function:
In each period, the Hamiltonian is given by the sum of the instantaneous objective function and the accrual of x evaluated at its marginal value. Therefore, H t (·) measures the total contribution of the activities going on at time t, including both the direct contribution to the summation in (1) and the value of x accrued in t. See Dorfman (1969) . Given (7), the FOCs in (4) − (6) can be re-arranged as follows.
The expressions in (8) − (10) are the core of the so-called "maximum principle" and they are suited for a straightforward interpretation. First, (8) suggests to maximize the Hamiltonian with respect to the control variables. Obviously, this can be done by differentiating H with respect to u and equating the partial derivatives to zero at any time. As stated above, a necessary and sufficient condition for this procedure to detect a proper maximum requires the concavity of the Hamiltonian 5 . Second, (9) states that along the optimal sequence, the decrease in the marginal value of a variation in x is given by the marginal contribution of the control variables to the Hamiltonian net of the yield on the marginal value of the accrual in x. In other words, at any time, the marginal value of the accrual in the control variables flows into the marginal contribution of the control variables net of their psychological cost 6 . Finally, (10) reproduces the original set of difference equations for the state variables. A special importance is attached to the FOC for the choice of the final value of x, i.e., x T +1 . Its expression can be derived as follows
The expression on the RHS of (11) is known as transversality condition and it states that the actual value of the marginal value of the control variables accrual at the end of 5 The Hamiltonian is concave (strictly concave) whenever its Hessian matrix evaluated along the optimal sequence is semidefinite (negative) definite. 6 This intriguing reading of the FOC on x t is given by Dorfman (1969) .
the period has to be zero 7 .
The arguments put forward above suggest that in order to find the trajectory that solve the continuous-time finite-horizon maximum problem given by
we have to follow the following steps. First, define the Hamiltonian. Hence,
Second, apply the continuous-counterpart of the FOCs in (8) − (10). Hence,
Finally, supplement the FOCs in (15)−(17) with the following transversality condition:
Notice that the FOCs in (8) − (10) ((15) − (17)) can be re-arranged to derive a system of difference (differential) equations for the control and state variables 8 . Usually, there are infinite trajectories that satisfy this system of difference (differential) equations that are called Pontryagin paths. Among this infinity, the trajectories that satisfy also transversality condition in (11) ( (18)) define exactly the solution of the maximum problem in (1) and (2) ( (12) and (13)). Obviously, if there are many trajectories that fulfill those requirements, the problem admits multiple solutions 9 .
Infinite-Horizon
Consider the discrete problem in (1) and (2) extended over an infinite horizon. Hence,
The additional problems that might arise in an infinite-horizon problem concern the fact that J (·) can be unbounded. In this case, no optimum exists. However, for a number of problems that we encounter in the optimal growth literature, a maximum problem extended over an infinite horizon can be solved by applying the FOCs from the finite case supplemented by a different transversality condition. Let's see how.
Suppose to define the following Lagrangian:
be a candidate sequence for the solution. Thereafter, evaluate the firstorder Taylor expansion of L(u t , x t ) in the neighborhood of L( u t , x t ), where {u t , x t } +∞ t=0 is an arbitrary sequence. Hence,
and Ψ(·) is an error term.
Consider the 3rd addend on the RHS of (22)
This term is given by
If the expression in (8) is assumed to hold from 0 to infinity, the 2nd term in (23) is equal to zero for all t. Therefore,
Some difficulties might arise with the 2nd addend on the RHS of (22), i.e., L x (x t − x t ). In the finite case, this term would be equal to
In the finite-horizon problem, (9) and (11) guarantee that the expression in (25) is equal to zero. However, in the infinite-horizon case, it is not enough to set the transversality condition in (11) , since x t may be growing (or declining) too fast.
For problems involving a positive discount rate, the transversality condition
is necessary and sufficient. See Weitzman (1973) . The continuous-time counterpart of (26) is given by
Notice that (26) and (27) are not a simple extension, respectively, of (11) and (18) over an infinite-horizon. As suggested by Shell (1969) , those transversality conditions express the desire of the maximizing agent to avoid "left over" valuable assets.
Sometimes (26) and (27) have been interpreted as a non-arbitrage conditions (noPonzi game conditions). See, for example, Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004). Indeed, those transversality conditions point out that the asymptotic actual value of the state variables has to be zero in the feasible manifold 10 . Moreover, the expressions in (26) and (27) suggest that explosive (or implosive) paths cannot be optimal.
The Benhabib-Farmer (1994) Model in Continuous Time
The Benhabib-Farmer (1994) model investigates the properties of the one-sector IH growth model by assuming increasing returns to scale. The possibility of aggregate increasing returns is the guile that allows to break down the uniqueness of the RE equilibrium and it is reconciled with the competitive behaviour of agents by using two distinct organizational structures, i.e., input externalities and monopolistic competition 11 .
Since the dynamic implications of each organizational structure are qualitatively similar, here we develop a simple continuous version with input externalities by showing the possible sub-optimality of a trajectory chosen by an omniscient social planner and the optimality of the "symmetric" decentralized solution 12 . Moreover, after having derived the condition for indeterminacy, we give some insights on how to model intrinsic (fundamental) and extrinsic uncertainty.
Building Blocks
As in the standard one-sector growth model, the Benhabib-Farmer (1994) model assumes that an infinitely-lived representative agent is called in to chose consumption (C) and employment (L) under the constraint implied by a capital (K) accumulation law. For sake of simplicity, in the reminder of the paper we omit the functional dependence of the variables on time. Thereafter, following the notation introduced in section 2, the maximum problem to be solved is given by
where u = C L . The instantaneous objective function is assumed to take the following form:
where γ 0 is the elasticity of labour supply.
11 On the one hand, the model with input externalities allows for the possibility that in a "symmetric equilibrium" the social technology might display increasing returns to scale. On the other hand, the model with monopolistic competition proposes a framework similar to the model developed by Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) . 12 A "symmetric" decentralized equilibrium is defined as a situation in which all the households take the same actions.
The expression in (30) deserves a short comment. First, as it will become apparent later on, if we combine separability between consumption and leisure with a Cobb-Douglas production function, the use of a logarithmic utility function over consumption is the only formulation of preferences consistent with a stationary labour supply in a growing economy. Second, the state variable K does not enter directly the instantaneous objective function.
The capital accumulation law for the overall economy takes the usual form. Hence,
where δ ∈ (0, 1) is the capital depreciation rate. The dependence of f C (·) on both control and state variables is assured by the production function. Indeed, the aggregate technology is represented by
where A is a productivity shock, i.e., the Solow's (1957) residual, while the inequality on the RHS allows for the possibility of increasing returns to scale at the social level 13 .
We distinguish the individual problem from the aggregate problem by using an externality argument. Specifically, we assume that the individual technology is given by a constant-returns-to-scale Cobb-Douglas function. Hence,
is a productivity parameter taken as given by the i-th household and i ∈ [0, 1] is an index for a continuum of identical producers. The terms with the upper bar represent, respectively, the aggregate stock of capital and the aggregate labour input 14 . In other words, we assume that the productivity of an individual firm's inputs is affected by the aggregate level of utilization of the same inputs.
The Centralized Solution
Suppose that an omniscient social planner is called in to choose the optimal path for our model economy. This planner will try to maximize the discounted sum of the individual 13 In other words, the aggregate production function explains how aggregate output responds whenever all the households expand their use of inputs simultaneously. 14 Notice that whenever there prevails a symmetric equilibrium, i.e., whenever (33) reduces to (32) .
welfare in (30) by taking into account that the aggregate technology might be subject to increasing returns to scale. In order to solve the social problem, we define an Hamiltonian as we did in (14) . Given, (30) and (31) we have
where λ can be interpreted as the social marginal value of a capital variation. Applying (15) − (17), the FOCs for the social maximum problem become
In section 2 we stressed that the conditions in (36) − (38) detect a maximum if and only if H C (·) is concave 15 . Simple algebra suggests that this is the case whenever
The proof is given in Appendix.
As long as aggregate technology displays increasing returns to scale, i.e., α + β > 1, there is no guarantee that (39) is verified. Specifically, this inequality may fail to hold in the case of increasing returns with respect to labour. Therefore, even if stable, the social planner's solution couldn't be optimal 16 .
The Decentralized Solution
A decentralized solution can be derived by re-formulating the problem as follows. Let 15 Notice that in the optimal-growth model the marginal value of a capital variation flows into the Hamiltonian net of its phycological cost plus depreciation. 16 Obviously, a divergent solution would violate the transversality condition lim
capital that it rents out to other households. Simultaneously, the i-th household demands L D i units of labour and rents K D i units of capital from others for the use in its own firm. Under these circumstances, the capital accumulation law for the i-th household is given by
where C i is its consumption, w is the real wage and r is the real rental rate. Notice that in a market-clearing equilibrium
Given (30) and (40), the Hamiltonian for the decentralized problem is the following:
where λ i is the private marginal value of a capital variation. Applying (15) − (17), the FOCs for the decentralized problem become ⎛
Moreover, the FOCs in (42)−(44) have to be supported by the following transversality condition:
Simple algebra suggests that in a market-clearing-symmetric equilibrium, i.e., whenever
The proof is given in Appendix. Therefore, the symmetric decentralized solution described by (42) − (45) is optimal.
17 Notice that in a decentralized symmetric equilibrium λ i = λ = λ, for all i.
The Labour Market
Now we show how the FOC in (42) entails the continuous (spot) equilibrium in the labour market. As it will be shown later on, in this model, the labour market equilibrium is the key to understand why prophecies might be self-fulfilling. Manipulating the elements in the first three rows of (42) leads to
The LHS of (46) is the labour supply of a single household while the RHS is its labour demand. Taking the logs of each member we derive
Obviously, the intersection of labour demand and supply provides the (log) equilibrium employment log L and the (log) equilibrium real wage (log w). See figure 1. 
where l ≡ log L and k ≡ log K. The LHS of (48) is the economy-wide labour supply while the RHS is the corresponding labour demand accounting for externalities. Remind that we assumed the possibility of increasing returns at the aggregate level, i.e., α + β 1. Therefore, whenever β > 1, the aggregate demand for labour is upward sloped 18 . See figure 2 .
The economy-wide labour market Finally, notice that given c and k, the equilibrium condition of the labour market provides the corresponding equilibrium level of L. This suggests that we can focus only on one control, i.e., the level of consumption.
Local Dynamics under the Decentralized Solution
In a market-clearing-symmetric equilibrium, i.e., whenever
Let y ≡ log Y . As a consequence, (49) and (50) become
In order to derive an autonomous system of differential equations we have to express y as a function of c and k. This becomes possible by combining the log-linearizations of (32) and an individual labour market-clearing equation. Hence,
Putting together (53) and (54), we derive
. Notice that only Φ 0 depends on the productivity shock.
Using the result in (55), it becomes possible to write down the pair of (autonomous) differential equations that define the Pontryagin paths. Hence,
Any trajectory {k(t), c(t)}
+∞ t=0 that solves (56) and (57) subject to the initial condition k(0) = ln (K 0 ) and the transversality condition in (45) is an equilibrium path for the model economy 19 . The unique steady-state solution is the following:
The Taylor first-order approximation of (56) and (57) around the stationary solution in (58) is given by
It is well known that the trace (TR(M)) of the 2 × 2 Jacobian matrix (M) in (59) measures the sum of its two eigenvalues (r 1 and r 2 ) while the determinant (DET(M)) measures their product. Moreover, it is also well known that the eigenvalues associated to M represent the slope of the phase diagram in the stationary solution c * k * when a linear transformation of the original variables is considered 20 . Given those algebraic results, the expressions in (58) and (59) suggest that productivity shocks affect only c * k * but not its local dynamics 21 .
More detailed information about local dynamics can be found by analysing the expressions for TR(M) and DET(M). Given the definitions of Φ 1 and Φ 2 , it is easy to show that
As a consequence of (61), it follows that
In an economy without externalities, i.e., whenever α = a < 1 and β = b < 1 (63) it holds that TR(M) = ρ and SGN[DET(M)] < 0. In this case r 1 and r 2 are of opposite sign so that the steady-state is a saddle point. This means that there is a one-dimensional manifold in the (c, k) space with the property that trajectories beginning on this manifold converge to the steady-state while all the others diverge. In other words, given k (0) there will be a unique c (0) in the neighbourhood of the stationary solution that generates a trajectory converging to c * k * . This value of c (0) should be selected in order to satisfy the transversality condition in (45) and it will place the system exactly on the stable branch of the saddle point c * k * . Therefore, the RE equilibrium path in the neighborhood of stationary solution is unique or "determinate". 20 See, for example, Gandolfo (1997) . 21 Indeed, Φ 0 does not enter the Jacobian matrix M .
An economy in which the inequalities in (63) are verified is usually termed as a real business cycle (RBC) economy because fluctuations can be driven only by intrinsic uncertainty, i.e., shocks to fundamentals 22 . See, for example, Kydland and Prescott (1982) .
By contrast, whenever externalities matter, i.e., whenever
it holds that TR(M) < 0 and SGN[DET(M)] > 0. This means that there are two negative eigenvalues so that the steady-state is a sink 23 . In other words, all the trajectories satisfying (56) and (57) which begin in the neighborhood of c * k * converge back to the steady-state. As a consequence, given k (0), there will be a continuum of equilibrium paths {k(t), c(t)} +∞ t=0 indexed by c (0), since any path converging to c * k * necessarily satisfies the transversality condition in (45). Completely stable steady-states giving rise to a continuum of equilibrium paths are termed "indeterminate" because all the trajectories are optimal in spite of the unique stationary solution.
The inequalities in (64) are known as the Benhabib-Farmer (1994) condition for indeterminacy and they identify a so-called "animal spirits" economy, i.e., an economy in which fundamentals are not able to pin down a unique RE equilibrium path. Notice that the RHS of (64) is predisposed for a straightforward economic rationalization. Specifically, it simply states that -as in figure 2 -labour demand slopes up more than labour supply 24 .
Incidentally, our local dynamics analysis allows us also to state two additional interesting conclusions. First, given the expressions in (55), (63) and (64), productivity shocks are pro-cyclical a RBC economy without externalities and counter-cyclical in an "animal spirits" economy. Second, suppose that the condition for the concavity of the Hamiltonian in the centralized problem is verified but α > 1. In this case, i.e., whenever there are increasing returns with respect to capital, given the result in (62), both r 1 and r 2 would be positive so that the steady-state would be an instable source whose explosive dynamics 22 Notice that this result would be obtained also from a central planner solution in which the production function is subject to constant returns to scale for each production factor. 23 As suggested by Benhabib and Farmer (1994) , whenever externalities matter we cannot rule out the case in which r 1 and r 2 become complex. In this case, ρ and δ can be used as bifurcation parameters that allow to detect limit cycles. 24 Using a particular identification strategy, Farmer and Guo (1995) show that this unusual characterization of the labour marker might be consistent with the US evidence over the period from 1929 to 1988. Empirical findings on increasing returns to scale that go in the same direction are found in Caballero and Lyons (1989) and Baxter and King (1991) .
is inconsistent with the due transversality condition.
Modeling Intrinsic and Extrinsic Uncertainty: the RBC Economy vs the "Animal Spirits" Economy
In a RBC economy fluctuations are driven only by intrinsic (fundamental) uncertainty. A simple way to model this kind of uncertainty is the definition of an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process for the log of the productivity shock 25 . Hence,
where κ is the rate of mean reversion, θ is the long run mean of the process, σ A is the instantaneous standard deviation and x is a standard Brownian motion with zero drift and unit variance 26 .
Obviously, given the results in (58) and (59), the actual realization of A will alter the stationary solution of the model economy but it won't change its determined local dynamics. Without loss of generality, assume that r 2 is the negative (convergent) eigenvalues of M. As a consequence, the path of a RBC economy is described by the following expression:
where A (t) follows the process in (65). By contrast, in an "animal spirits" economy fundamentals cannot pin down a unique RE equilibrium path. This path multiplicity can be solved by modeling extrinsic uncertainty, i.e., by explicitly defining a process for the beliefs of households that is independent of preferences, endowments and technology. As suggested by Farmer and Guo (1994) a simple way to model a belief function is to augment the differential equation for c with any random variable V (t) that has a zero conditional mean. Moreover, in order to avoid the counter-factual procyclicality of negative productivity shocks, the value of A (t) is usually set to a constant value 27 . As a consequence, the path of an "animal spirits" economy is described by the following expression:
(67) where E [V (t)] = 0, for all t, r 1 < 0 and r 2 < 0.
The actual realization of V (t) is the guile that allows to solve the path multiplicity implied by the Benhabib-Farmer (1994) condition for indeterminacy in (64). In other words, among the infinite equilibrium paths, the realization of V (t) selects the trajectory actually followed by an "animal spirits" economy 28 .
Notice that this is a fairly rough-and-ready way to handle beliefs 29 . Indeed, in a very interesting paper, Kamihigashi (1996) states the observational equivalence between a RBC and an "animal spirits" economy. Specifically, Kamihigashi (1996) shows that given a realization of A (t) (V (t)) it is always possible to define a process for V (t) (A (t)) such that the optimal path for a RBC ("animal spirits") economy is an optimal path also for an "animal spirits" (RBC) economy. Given this result, it is clearly impossible on a pure empirical ground to assess whether a particular trajectory comes from a RBC or an "animal spirits" economy. Moreover, as suggested by Boldrin and Rustichini (1994) , if indeterminacy is taken seriously, the interpretation of many simple empirical contributions obtained by pooling together data from different countries can be questioned. Specifically, there is no reason to believe that these countries should be moving along the same equilibrium saddle path.
Why are Prophecies Self-Fulfilling? A Discussion
It might seem quite striking that the conditions for indeterminacy should lead to precise implications for the labour market outlook. However, if we think to the inherent logic underlying the standard IH optimal-growth model, the reasons of such a link are straightforward. A suggestive explanation has been suggested by Aiyagari (1995) .
27 Kamihigashi (1996) defines "animal spirits" economies as economies with externalities and sunspots but without productivity shocks. 28 This procedure of randomization over a set of infinite equilibrium paths is found also in OLG models with indeterminate equilibria. See, for example, Farmer and Woodford (1990) . 29 More interesting possibilities are explored, for example, in Branch and Evans (2006) .
Consider (47) and (48). The position of the labour demand schedule is fixed by the stock of capital. By contrast, the position of the labour supply schedule is fixed by the level of consumption. In the absence of shocks, a unique level of consumption determines a unique position for the labour supply schedule. This position, in turn, determines the unique equilibrium level of employment. Therefore, there will be a unique level of output and investment (from the resource constraint), which means a unique level of capital stock for the next period. See (31) and (40). From this argument, it is clear that the key to indeterminacy is that there can't be a unique position of the labour supply schedule, which means that there can't be a unique level of consumption.
Along the lines put forward in the introduction, optimistic (pessimistic) expectations might lead households to spend more (less) in consumption. Obviously, this will shift their labour supply schedules. In order to have an equilibrium path driven by self-fulfilling beliefs, these shifts have to lead to labour, output and investment effects that ratify the original optimistic (pessimistic) expectations. How this might happen? Presumably, current income and expectations on future income are what influence consumption most. In order for the households to consume more (less) initially, they have to be optimistic (pessimistic) either that current and future labour incomes will be high (low) or that current and future interest rates will be low (high). In the labour market depicted in figure 1, optimistic (pessimistic) expectations that lead households to consume more (less), lead also the labour supply to shift inward (outward). Obviously, this lowers (raises) the current level of employment. Thus, current output and investment are lowered (raised). Thereby, future capital stock and, hence, future employment, output, and so on, are lowered (raised). Moreover, future interest rates are raised (lowered) since the capital stock is lowered (raised). These outcomes are clearly inconsistent with the original optimistic (pessimistic) expectations.
The arguments above suggest a way in which optimist (pessimistic) expectations can be self-fulfilling. Consider the labour market in figure 2 . In this case, optimistic (pessimistic) expectations will shift the labour supply inward (outward). This will raise (lower) employment and output. By raising (lowering) current output, optimistic (pessimistic) expectations can also raise (lower) the future capital stock and possibly lower (raise) interest rates. These effects are consistent with the higher (lower) initial consumption. Therefore, the original optimistic (pessimistic) expectations are self-validating 30 .
Concluding Remarks
This paper provided a self-contained discussion about the introduction of the animal spirits hypothesis into the IH optimal growth model. Our analysis begun with a quick economic review of the Pontryagin's maximum principle. Thereafter, we developed a continuous version of the increasing-returns Benhabib-Farmer (1994) model by showing the problematic nature of a trajectory chosen by an omniscient social planner and the optimality of the "symmetric" decentralized equilibrium path. Moreover, after having derived the condition for indeterminacy, we provided some insights on how to model intrinsic (fundamental) and extrinsic uncertainty. Finally, analysing the (spot) equilibrium condition of the labour market, we provided an intuitive rationale for the possibility of self-validating equilibrium paths. The Benhabib-Farmer (1994) condition for indeterminacy has been widely criticized. On a pure empirical ground, Basu and Fernald (1997) argued that the degree of increasing returns required to generate an upward sloping labour demand seems to be implausible if compared to circumstantial evidence. The macroeconomists of self-fulfilling prophecies tried to address this criticism by developing multi-sector models in which indeterminacy arises with constant returns to scale and very small market imperfections 31 . However, there is another important theoretical shortcoming in models with indeterminate equilibrium paths, i.e., the assumption of continuous equilibrium in the labour market. In other words, there is no role for non-voluntary unemployment in models that allow for self-fulfilling prophecies. Of course, there are some exceptions to this rule, each of them developed by exploiting the search approach to unemployment made popular by Pissarides (1990) . In particular, we refer to the works by Burda and Weder (2002) and Giammarioli (2003) . The former focuses on the complementarity between labour market institutions, the resulting equilibrium unemployment and the propagation of business cycles. The latter shows the possibility of an indeterminate equilibrium path whenever the social matching function displays a certain degree of increasing returns to scale with respect to vacancies. It is well known that search unemployment falls in the category of "frictional" unemployment. Indeed, in the matching framework, the responsive for unemployment is the absence of a mechanism (say a market) in which the decisions of workers and firms might be efficiently coordinated. The task of building models with indeterminate equilibrium paths and involuntary unemployment is still in progress 32 .
Appendixes
In this section we discuss the conditions for the concavity of the Hamiltonian functions in the centralized and decentralized solution of the Benhabib-Farmer (1994) model.
Concavity of the Hamiltonian in the Centralized Solution
The FOC in (36) suggests that the Hessian matrix of H C (·) is given by
The matrix in (67) (H C (·)) is negative semidefinite (concave) whenever
Concavity of the Hamiltonian in the Decentralized Solution
Considering the conditions for a symmetric market-clearing equilibrium, i.e., L 
The matrix in (69) (H D (·)) is negative definite (strictly concave) whenever
